TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

KEY FINDINGS 2006

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Transatlantic Trends 2006 Partners

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TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Key Findings 2006

Five years after September 11, 2001, the image of the United States in the eyes of the world has not recovered from its steep decline after the war in Iraq. Yet at the official level there have been efforts at rapprochement, shifting the transatlantic policy agenda toward the challenges of emerging global threats and concerns. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Daniel Fried declared last fall, "The relationship between the United States and Europe is focused less on itself…and more on putting that relationship to work."[1] Similarly, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso recently observed, "EU-U.S. relations have strengthened considerably over the last year, and we are working together systematically to address common economic, political, and environmental challenges."[2] In this year's *Transatlantic Trends*, our fifth annual survey, we analyze whether and how this spirit of working together at the official level is reflected in American and European public opinion on a range of global threats and policy issues.

Cooperation between the United States and the European Union (led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons is perhaps the most prominent example of greater consultation and policy coordination. The United States and the European Union have also been working closely in the past year in the Balkans, Belarus, and Sudan. At the same time, public debate on both sides of the Atlantic has wrestled with allegations of secret CIA prisons in Europe, continued violence in Iraq, and concerns about human rights in the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The recently thwarted attack on transatlantic flights from London raises the following question: Is there a gap in the threat perception of Americans and Europeans concerning international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism? Do they draw the line on civil liberties differently when asked about granting greater governmental authority in the effort to prevent terrorism? What do they think their governments should do about the threat of a nuclear Iran, especially if diplomacy fails? How do they view the growing power of China or increased immigration within their own borders? Do they still support NATO in light of this fall's summit addressing its future? Given instability in the Middle East, how do Americans and Europeans feel about democracy promotion and its chances in the region?

The prospects for transatlantic cooperation will be shaped in part by domestic developments within the United States and Europe. We explored differences in the United States between Democrats and Republicans on Iran, democracy promotion, and civil liberties in light of the upcoming midterm elections. Despite the rejections of the proposed constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, we found continued strong support across Europe for EU global leadership and reforms such as a new EU foreign minister. Contrary to public concerns about "enlargement fatigue," our results suggest that Europeans see positive benefits from enlargement of the EU's borders. At the same time, Europeans remain divided over strengthening their military forces and ambivalent about Turkey joining the EU. In addition, this year's survey includes two new countries, Romania and Bulgaria, that could join the EU as early as 2007. We also devote close attention to Turkey, which appears to be turning away from the United States and Europe in the face of increasing instability and violence on its borders in the Middle East.

Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was

[1] Foreign Press Center Briefing, New York, September 19, 2005. http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/53530.htm
[2] EU-U.S. Summit, Vienna 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_06/index.htm

conducted in the United States and 12 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation.

KEY FINDINGS OF THIS SURVEY INCLUDE:[3]

- Large majorities of Americans and Europeans agree on the importance of global threats, with the largest increase over the past year in those who see Islamic fundamentalism as an "extremely important" threat, led by the United Kingdom, where the increase was 22 percentage-points.

- While support for EU leadership in world affairs has remained strong since 2002, Europeans are divided over how it should play a larger role, with 46% who agree that the EU should strengthen its military power and 51% who disagree.

- Sixty-five percent of Europeans agree that the EU should have its own foreign minister, one of the key reforms put forth in the proposed constitutional treaty.

- Seventy-nine percent of Americans and 84% of Europeans agree that efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should continue, with only 15% of Americans and 5% of Europeans seeing military action as the best option.

- If non-military options toward Iran should fail, 53% of Americans who support efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would support military action, compared with 45% of Europeans. Fifty-four percent of French respondents, though, would support military action if non-military options fail.

- Americans and Europeans show broad agreement on where to compromise on civil liberties, opposing greater governmental authority to monitor citizens' telephone calls as part of the effort to prevent terrorism but supporting greater authority to monitor communications on the Internet and install surveillance cameras in public places. They disagree about whether to grant greater governmental authority to monitor banking transactions, with more Americans opposed than Europeans.

- There is a partisan divide within the United States on civil liberties, with a majority of Democrats opposing greater government authority to monitor telephone calls, communications on the Internet, and banking transactions as part of the effort to prevent terrorism, all of which a majority of Republicans support. The parties agree, however, on greater government authority to install surveillance cameras in public places.

- Fifty-six percent of Americans and Europeans do not feel that the values of Islam are compatible with the values of democracy. However, majorities also agree that the problem is with particular Islamic groups, not with Islam in general. Sixty-six percent of Democrats and 59% of Republicans agree.

- European support for NATO has declined from 69% in 2002 to 55% in 2006, with large declines in countries traditionally perceived as strong supporters of NATO—Germany, Italy, Poland, and Turkey.

- Sixty-three percent of Europeans agree that further enlargement of the European Union will help it to play a more important role in world affairs, and 62% agree that further enlargement will promote peace and democracy along its borders.

- Turkey has cooled toward the United States and Europe but warmed toward Iran. On a 100-point "thermometer" scale, Turkish "warmth" toward the United States declined from 28 degrees in 2004 to 20 in 2006, and toward the European Union from 52 degrees to 45. Over the same period, Turkish warmth toward Iran rose from 34 degrees to 43.

[3] Unless otherwise noted, Europe-wide percentages refer to E12, except in sections one, three, and four where we discuss long-term trends, and questions where we examine the opinions of current EU members.

Section One: Trends in Transatlantic Relations

Although U.S. and European policymakers report that official relations have improved in the past year, most observers argue that the image of the United States and President Bush among the European publics has not improved since their strong opposition to the war in Iraq in 2003.[4] New German Chancellor Angela Merkel changed the tenor of U.S.-German relations, but her warm visits to Washington and welcome of President Bush to Germany were accompanied by persistent concerns about the alleged CIA rendition of a German citizen and the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. How has public opinion responded to change at the official level? Have negative attitudes in Europe toward President Bush, as some warned, led to negative views of the United States in general? Is the decline in views of the United States reflected in European views of NATO?

PERSISTENT DECLINE IN VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 2002

The proportions of Europeans who view U.S. leadership in world affairs as desirable has reversed since 2002, from 64% positive to 37% this year, and from 31% negative to 57%. Among European countries, the greatest decline was in Germany, from 68% positive in 2002 to 43% in 2006. Since 2004, this reversal has remained virtually unchanged. Only three European countries currently view U.S. leadership more positively than negatively: the Netherlands (51% to 44%), Romania (47% to 35%), and the United Kingdom (48% to 45%). Similarly, when asked to evaluate their feelings of warmth toward the United States on a 100-point thermometer scale, Europeans ratings declined from 64 degrees in 2002 to 51 in 2006. (See chart #1)



Chart 1



Chart 2

[4] See *America Against the World: How we are different and why we are disliked,* Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, New York: Times Books, 2006.

EUROPEANS CONTINUE TO DISTINGUISH VIEWS OF PRESIDENT BUSH FROM THE U.S.

Europeans continue to distinguish between their views of President Bush and their views of the United States more generally. While European attitudes toward President Bush's handling of international affairs have fallen from 38% positive in 2002 to 18% in 2006, there is a 19-point gap between this figure and their evaluation of U.S. leadership in world affairs. This gap has generally persisted over five years. Negative attitudes toward President Bush also have risen in the United States, where, for the first time since 2002, more Americans disapprove (58%) than approve (40%) of President Bush's handling of international affairs. As one would expect, a far greater number of Democrats (83%) disapprove than Republicans (19%), with greater negatives in both parties since last year. (See chart #2 on page 5)

EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR NATO DECLINES

The percentage of Europeans who agree that NATO is essential for their country's security has declined each year since 2002, from 69% that year to 55% in 2006. The largest declines have come in countries traditionally perceived as strong supporters of NATO; in Germany, support fell from 74% in 2002 to 56% in 2006, and in Italy, support dropped from 68% in 2002 to 52% in 2006. In Poland support fell from 64% in 2002 to 48% in 2006, and in Turkey, support dropped from 53% in 2004 to 44% in 2006.[5] In the United States, support for NATO rose from 56% in 2002 to 61% in 2006. (See chart #3)

EUROPEANS WANT TO BE MORE INDEPENDENT, AMERICANS BEGINNING TO AGREE

A majority of Europeans (55%) support a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union (compared to 50% in 2004). While the largest percentage of Americans want closer relations, this has dropped from 60% in 2004 to 45% in 2006, and those who wish to take a more independent approach have increased from 20% in 2004 to 30% in 2006. Romania (51%) and Poland (41%) have the highest support for closer relations in Europe. Only in France and Italy were there increases in support for closer relations since last year, with France seeing a nine percentage-point increase (to 30%) and Italy seeing a six percentage-point increase (to 35%).



Chart 3

1. Data from 2003 comes from the Office of Research, U.S. State Department.

Section Two: Challenges and Threats on the Global Agenda

Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, recently described the transatlantic agenda, saying "what [we] have begun to think [about] is how to resolve together the many problems, which are an international agenda."[6] Yet, do Americans and Europeans see today's world in the same way? After years of different approaches toward Iran's nuclear program, the United States and the European Union (led by France, Germany, and United Kingdom) agreed upon a common transatlantic position last year, transforming the situation. Concerns about international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism were heightened again after the subway bombings in London last July, attacks on European embassies and consulates in the Middle East following a Danish newspaper publishing



Chart 4

[6] Speech at Brussels Forum 2006, April 28, 2006. http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/template/transcript_detail.cfm?id=2

cartoons satirizing the prophet Mohammed, and the recently thwarted plot to bomb transatlantic airliners. In this section, we devote attention to support for policy options on dealing with Iran. We also explore American and European attitudes toward immigration, global warming, economic downturn, and China's rising power. Threat perceptions raise questions about what to do, especially concerning civil liberties, a complex issue involving different traditions, institutions, and policies. The prospects for transatlantic cooperation will depend in part on developments within the United States and Europe, so we highlight variations within Europe as well as partisan differences in the United States.

AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS AGREE ON GLOBAL THREATS

Large majorities—topping 70% of Americans and Europeans—continue to agree on the importance of a wide range of international threats in the next 10 years, including international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, immigration, the global spread of disease such as avian flu, global warming, the growing power of China, and violence and instability in Iraq. The intensity of threat perception is higher among Americans than Europeans on all threats but global warming. (See chart #4 on page 7)

INCREASED CONCERN ABOUT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

The largest shifts in threat perceptions since last year were increases on both sides of the Atlantic in those who see Islamic fundamentalism as an "extremely important" threat (+13 percentage-points of Americans, +11 percentage-points of Europeans). The largest increases among Europeans were in the United Kingdom (+22 percentage-points), Italy (+19 percentage-points), and Spain (+12 percentage-points).



Chart 5

IRAN GREATER THREAT THAN IRAQ

Larger percentages of Americans and Europeans see Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as an "extremely important" threat (75% and 58%, respectively) than continued violence and instability in Iraq (56% and 45%, respectively). Among Europeans, the highest percentages of respondents who see Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as an extremely important threat are in Portugal (69%), Spain (68%), Germany (67%), and Poland (64%). On Iraq, the highest intensities of threat perception in Europe are in Spain (53%) and the United Kingdom (52%). For more information on American and European attitudes toward Iran, see the accompanying section on page 10.

BROAD AGREEMENT ON WHERE TO COMPROMISE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES

Although public debate might lead one to expect that Americans and Europeans have different views of how to respond to terrorism, we found broad agreement on both sides of the Atlantic on where to draw the line on civil liberties. Fifty-nine percent of both Americans and Europeans oppose greater governmental authority to monitor citizens' telephone calls as part of the effort to prevent terrorism. Americans and Europeans also agree that governments should have greater authority to monitor communications on the Internet (54% of both Americans and Europeans in favor) and to install surveillance cameras in public places (71% of Americans and 78% of Europeans in favor). They disagree about greater authority to monitor banking transactions, with 58% of Americans opposed and 50% of Europeans in favor. (See chart #5)

SPLIT BETWEEN DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES

Within the United States, there is a partisan divide on granting the government greater authority as part of

continued on page 12

U.S. VIEWS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES



Chart 6

AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN VIEWS ON IRAN

How willing are Americans and Europeans to support the full range of policy options surrounding Iran, especially should negotiations and a possible UN resolution fail to halt its nuclear program? We asked questions about support for the current initiatives to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, as well as potential future options, including economic incentives, economic and political sanctions, and, ultimately, military force if diplomatic options should fail. By considering support for current and future options, we can assess the overall potential support among American and European publics for the use of force, as well as for accepting a nuclear Iran.

MAJORITIES SUPPORT CURRENT EFFORTS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR IRAN

Seventy-nine percent of Americans and 84% Europeans agree that efforts by the United States and the European Union to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should continue. When asked about the best option for doing so, the largest percentage of Americans (36%) presently prefers economic sanctions while the largest percentage of Europeans (46%) prefers economic incentives. Only very small percentages of both Americans (15%) and Europeans (5%) feel that military action is currently the best option. (See chart #7)

IF NON-MILITARY OPTIONS FAIL, AMERICANS AND FRENCH SUPPORT MILITARY FORCE IN IRAN

If non-military options fail, 53% of Americans who support efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would support military action, compared with 45% of Europeans. In France, Germany, and The United Kingdom, the countries leading negotiations with Iran for the EU, 54% of French respondents would also support military action if non-military options fail, followed by 46% of British and 40% of German respondents. The largest percentages in the United States (36%) and Europe (47%) agree that the United Nations can best handle the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons. This is true both for respondents who are willing to accept a nuclear Iran and for those who support military force against Iran. Only 9% of Europeans believe that the



Chart 7

United States can best handle the issue, compared with 22% of Americans. (See chart #8)

FACED WITH POLICY OPTIONS, MORE AMERICANS WILLING TO CONSIDER FORCE IN IRAN

An aggregate portrait of American and European support for current and future policy options on Iran reveals that 45% of Americans would support the use of force either now or if non-military options should fail, while 35% of Americans would accept a nuclear Iran, and 20% are uncertain about what to do. Europeans (E11) are nearly evenly divided between 37% who would support the use of force



EU-3 SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR IRAN VS. TAKE MILITARY ACTION IF DIPLOMACY FAILS

Chart 8



VIEWS ON USE OF FORCE IN IRAN

Chart 9

either now or should non-military options fail and 38% who would accept a nuclear Iran, with 25% who are uncertain what to do. Among Turkish respondents, only 10% would support the use of force either now or if non-military options should fail, while 56% would accept a nuclear Iran, and 34% are uncertain about what to do. (See chart #9 on page 11)

AMERICANS AGREE ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR IRAN BUT DIVIDED OVER MILITARY OPTION

In the United States, Democrats and Republicans overwhelmingly agree (73% and 88%, respectively) that efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should continue, with only small minorities of both parties who feel that military action is the best option (15% of Democrats and 19% of Republicans). The parties diverge over what to do if non-military options should fail; 70% of Republicans but only 41% of Democrats would support military action under those circumstances. The parties also differ regarding who can best handle the issue, with largest percentage of Democrats (46%) supporting the United Nations, and the largest percentage of Republicans (34%) favoring the United States. (See chart #10)



Chart 10

continued from page 9

efforts to prevent terrorism. Majorities of Democrats oppose greater government authority to monitor telephone calls (78%), monitor communications on the Internet (55%), and monitor citizens' banking transactions (71%), whereas majorities of Republicans support greater government authority on each issue (61% in favor of monitoring telephone calls, 72% of monitoring communications on the Internet, and 56% of monitoring banking transactions). Majorities of both parties (65% of Democrats and 80% of Republicans) support greater government authority to install surveillance cameras in public places. (See chart #6 on page 9)

AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS SEE RISE OF CHINA DIFFERENTLY

When asked to evaluate their feelings of warmth toward China on a 100-point thermometer scale, American and European ratings were virtually identical (46 degrees to 45, respectively). But 38% of Americans, compared with 27% of Europeans, feel that the rise of China is an "extremely important threat" in the next 10 years. In the United States, the largest percentage of respondents are more concerned by the threat posed by growing Chinese military power (35%), while in Europe, the largest percentage of respondents is more concerned by

the threat posed by the growing Chinese economy (37%). Among Europeans, the highest perception of threat from the Chinese economy is in France (53%), Portugal (52%), and Italy (51%). Within the United States, Democrats are more concerned about the economic (37%) than military threat (28%), and Republicans are more concerned about the military (42%) than economic threat (21%). (See chart #11)

IMMIGRATION SEEN AS A THREAT ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC

Seventy-nine percent of Americans and 76% of Europeans agree that large numbers of immigrants coming into their country is an important threat. On both sides of the Atlantic, the percentages of those who see immigration as an "extremely important" threat has increased since 2005, from 35% to 42% in the United States, and from 27% to 32% in Europe. Many more Republicans (51%) than Democrats (29%) agree, and among Europeans, the highest percentages that see immigration as an extremely important threat are in Spain (49%, an increase from 28% in 2005), the United Kingdom (42%), and Portugal (41%).



Chart 11

Section Three: Democracy Promotion

The United States and the European Union declared at their 2006 annual summit, "we recognize that the advance of democracy is a strategic priority of our age."[7] The two partners have cooperated closely in the Western Balkans on the final status of Kosovo, the contested presidential election in Belarus, and efforts to relieve suffering in Sudan. Yet the elections of a Hamas-led government in Palestine and a government in Lebanon including Hezbollah have raised difficult questions about democracy promotion in the Middle East and about the compatibility of Islam and democracy, a complex issue relating to views of religion and state. Last year's *Transatlantic Trends* found that more Europeans than Americans supported democracy promotion while both sides strongly preferred "soft power" options. This year, we probed further, to see whether these findings were stable and how deep public support is, given the continued challenges in the Middle East.

AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION SOFTENS

When asked whether it should be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries, 71% of Europeans agreed, a figure nearly unchanged from 2005. Forty-five percent of Americans agreed when asked if it should be the role of the United States, a decline of seven percentage-points from last year. As in 2005, breakdown by U.S. party affiliation shows a strong partisan divide, with only 35% of Democrats agreeing compared to 64% of Republicans. These percentages



Chart 12



Chart 13

[7] Vienna Summit Declaration, EU-U.S. Summit, June 21, 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_06/docs/decl_final_210606.pdf

reflect declines in support in both parties (minus-eight percentage-points among Democrats and minus-12 percentage-points among Republicans). (See charts #12 and #13)

DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FORCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY

Asked whether they would support one or more policy options to promote democracy, Americans and Europeans show strong support for less intrusive options such as monitoring elections (79% of Europeans, 67% of Americans) and supporting independent groups such as trade unions, human rights associations, and religious groups (77% of Europeans, 71% of Americans). Support declined when asked about more intrusive or severe options, such as economic sanctions, supporting political dissidents, political sanctions, and use of military force. These percentages remain largely unchanged from last year, with the exception of support for military force, which declined eight percentage-points among Europeans to 24%. In the United States, support for military force continued to show a strong partisan divide, with the support of 28% of Democrats and 54% of Republicans. (See charts #14, and #15 on page 16)

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION UNLESS ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS ELECTED

Fifty-nine percent of Americans and 60% of Europeans would continue to support democracy promotion even if the countries in question would be more likely to oppose U.S. or EU policies. When asked if they would continue to hold these views even if it was likely that these countries would elect Islamic fundamentalist leaders, 53% of Americans agree, while European support drops to 33%. Notably, 54% of Turkish respondents agree, a percentage almost identical to Americans.



Chart 14



Chart 15

INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY DUE TO PARTICULAR ISLAMIC GROUPS

Fifty-six percent of Americans and Europeans (E12) feel the values of Islam are not compatible with the values of their country's democracy. The highest percentages among Europeans were in Germany (67%), Slovakia (63%), and Spain and Italy (62%). Forty-five percent of Turkish respondents feel the values of Islam are not compatible with democracy, which may reflect their country's long debate on secularism. Sixty percent of both Americans and Europeans (E12) who hold these views feel that the problem is with particular Islamic groups, not with Islam in general. While the largest percentages of both Democrats and Republicans feel that the values of Islam are not compatible with democracy, many more Republicans (67%) than Democrats (47%) hold this view. Sixty-six percent of Democrats and 59% of Republicans agree that the problem is with particular Islamic groups.

Section Four: A Period of "Reflection" in Europe

Since the rejection of the proposed constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the European Union has been in a period of "reflection" about its future. Riots by second-generation immigrant youth in France last fall raised questions about multiculturalism and Europe's economic prospects. Policymakers debated "enlargement fatigue," wondering whether the EU could continue to admit new members on its borders and remain a coherent international actor. Romania and Bulgaria moved closer to joining the EU, and Turkey and Croatia were invited to begin accession negotiations, but questions were raised about when Turkey would be ready to join. Turkish politicians, in turn, warned that frustrations over accession could turn Turkey away from the EU and the West. How have these widespread concerns and debates shaped attitudes toward the EU's role in international affairs? Given strong support for EU global leadership, how willing are Europeans to play a military role in international affairs? Are Europeans as skeptical toward further enlargement as their politicians?

STRONG SUPPORT BUT DECLINING INTENSITY FOR EU LEADERSHIP AMONG CORE MEMBERS

Overall support for the European Union to exert strong leadership in world affairs has remained very strong since 2002, with 81% of respondents seeing EU leadership as desirable in 2002 and 76% feeling the same in 2006. The intensity of this support, however, has dropped considerably in some of the founding members of the European Union, with the percentage of French

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

Chart 16

IS TURKEY TURNING AWAY FROM THE WEST?

Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül warned recently that Turkey is at risk of turning away from its traditional alliances in the West, that "moderate liberal people [in Turkey] are becoming anti-American and anti-EU," especially "young, dynamic, educated, and economically active people."[8] Although the European Union invited Turkey to begin accession negotiations in October 2005, the initial steps have been characterized by frustration over the unresolved situation in Cyprus and public skepticism about Turkey's candidacy voiced by some European politicians. The sense that Turkey was not welcome was reinforced by the change in the French constitution last year to require a referendum for future enlargements after Romania and Bulgaria. U.S.-Turkish official relations have been strained, and Turkey has repeatedly expressed concerns with the instability on its borders with Iraq and with U.S. policies in the Middle East. In this time of uncertainty about Turkey's future in the EU and its border relations, can we observe trends in public opinion?

TURKEY COOLING TOWARD U.S. AND EU, WARMING TOWARD IRAN

Turkish feelings toward the United States and Europe have cooled since 2004, with a warmth reading toward the United States declining from 28 degrees in 2004 to 20 in 2006 on a 100-point thermometer scale, and from 52 degrees to 45 toward the European Union. Over the same period, the warmth reading of Turkish feelings toward Iran has risen from 34 degrees to 43, and their feelings toward the Palestinians have declined from 52 degrees to 47. (See chart #17)

YOUNGER TURKS WARMER TOWARD BOTH U.S. AND EU

Younger Turks, however, have warmer feelings toward both the United States and the European Union than the national averages, with a thermometer reading among 18 to 24-year-olds of 27 degrees toward the



Chart 17

[8] "Anti-west backlash is gaining pace, warns Turkish minister," *Financial Times,* July 20, 2006, page 11.

United States and 48 degrees toward the European Union. Overall, warmth toward both the United States and the European Union was negatively correlated with age, suggesting that the younger Turks are not more anti-American or anti-EU than older generations.



Chart 18

DECLINING SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN TURKEY

While a majority of Turkish respondents continue to see membership as a good thing, the percentage of Turks who see Turkey's membership as a good thing has fallen each year from 73% in 2004 to 54% in 2006, while the percentage of Turkish respondents who see Turkey's membership as a bad thing has increased from 9% to 22% over that same time. (See chart #18)

TURKEY MOST CRITICAL OF BUSH AND NEGATIVE TOWARD EU LEADERSHIP

Among Europeans, Turkey has the lowest approval rating for President Bush's handling of international policies, with only seven percent approving and 81% disapproving. The strongest negative feelings toward U.S. leadership in world affairs were also found in Turkey, where 56% of respondents viewed U.S. leadership as "very undesirable." At the same time, Turkish support for strong EU leadership in world affairs also dropped, from 50% in 2005 to 35% in 2006.

DOWNWARD TREND IN TURKISH SUPPORT FOR NATO

While 53% agreed with the statement that NATO is still essential for Turkey's security in 2004 and 52% in 2005, only 44% of Turkish respondents agreed in 2006. This percentage, while no longer a majority, remains the largest percentage of Turkish respondents.

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respondents who see EU leadership as "very desirable" dropping from 40% in 2002 to 24% in 2006. Similarly, this percentage has dropped in Italy from 53% in 2002 to 31% in 2006 and in the Netherlands from 42% to 36% in 2006. Only Germany, among the founding members surveyed, has remained constant, with 27% in 2002 and 31% in 2006.

WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR EU FOREIGN MINISTER

Sixty-five percent of Europeans agree that the EU should have its own foreign minister—one of the key reforms put forth in the proposed constitutional treaty—even if their country might not always agree with the positions taken. Support is highest in Spain (74%) and Italy (71%) and lowest in Slovakia (48%) and the United Kingdom (52%). (See chart #16 on page 17)

COMPETING VIEWS ABOUT DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

When asked whether the EU should strengthen its military power in order to play a larger role in the world, 46% of Europeans agree and 51% disagree. As past *Transatlantic Trends* surveys have suggested, this disagreement reflects competing views of the EU as an international actor between those who feel the EU should increase its military power and those who feel the EU should concentrate on economic power. The highest support for strengthening military power is found in Portugal (68%), France (56%), and Poland (51%), with the lowest support in Germany (35%).

EUROPEANS FEEL FURTHER ENLARGEMENT WILL HELP EU IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Majorities of Europeans agree that further enlargement of the European Union will help it play a more important



Chart 19

role in world affairs (63%). The largest percentages are found in countries about to join the EU, Romania (85%) and Bulgaria (82%), followed by Spain (78%), Poland (77%), Portugal (74%), and Slovakia (73%). Similarly, a majority of Europeans agree that further enlargement will promote peace and democracy along its borders (62%). At the same time, a majority of Europeans feel that further enlargement will make it even more difficult to develop a common European identity (58%). (See chart #19)

"NEW" EU MEMBERS NOT A COHERENT BLOC

New and prospective EU members surveyed—Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania,—do not appear as a group to hold significantly different views on the EU or the United States from the European averages. The percentages of Poles and Romanians who support strong EU leadership in world affairs (70% and 66%, respectively) is close to the European average of 76%, while the percentages are lower in Bulgaria and Slovakia (56% and 50%, respectively). Yet Poland and Romania also show the highest support for President Bush's policies (40% and 42%, respectively), where Bulgaria and Slovakia (20% and 23%, respectively) are closer to the European average of 18%.

NEGATIVE TRENDS IN EUROPEAN VIEWS ABOUT TURKEY JOINING THE EU

When asked whether Turkey's membership in the European Union would be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad, the largest percentage of Europeans continue to feel it would be neither good nor bad (40%, a figure unchanged since 2004). Among those who have an opinion, however, there has been a reversal in the percentages who see Turkey's membership as a good or bad thing—those who see Turkey's membership as a good thing have fallen each year from 30% in 2004 to 21% in 2006, and those who see Turkey's membership as a bad thing have grown from 20% in 2004 to 32% in 2006. The largest increases in negative views since 2004 have been in Slovakia (+21 percentage-points), the Netherlands (+18 percentage-points), and Germany and Spain (+14 percentage-points each). (See chart #20)



Chart 20

AMERICANS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT STRONG EU LEADERSHIP

Americans continue to feel positively about the European Union and to support strong EU leadership in the world. Americans registered an increase in their feelings of warmth toward the EU from 53 degrees to 60 on a 100-point thermometer scale between 2002 and 2006. Seventy-six percent of Americans also support strong leadership for the EU in world affairs in 2006 (nearly unchanged from 79% in 2002). There is no partisan difference on this issue, with 75% of both Republicans and Democrats agreeing.

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Five: Conclusion

Although the image of the United States has not recovered among Europeans, this year's *Transatlantic Trends* suggests that American and European views of international threats and challenges may not be so far apart. Concerns about Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism have risen on both sides of the Atlantic in the past year. There is strong support for continuing efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, although there are likely to be differences should military force become a serious option. Iran may offer a good case for the development of a common European foreign policy since public opinion is relatively united, yet Europeans remain divided about how the EU should play a larger role in the world. Americans and Europeans seem to agree on where to compromise on civil liberties in the effort to prevent terrorism, although a closer look at the United States shows significant differences between Republicans and Democrats. While China's rising power is viewed differently, with more Americans than Europeans concerned about a potential military threat, both are concerned about the compatibility of Islam and democracy and agree that the problem is with particular Islamic groups.

The United States and its European allies will debate NATO's future this fall at the Riga summit at a time when we find declining support for the alliance in Europe. This is perhaps most worrisome when this trend is led by notable declines in public support among traditionally strong supporters of NATO, including Germany, Italy, Poland, and Turkey. Public support for NATO, other surveys show, has rebounded after comparable low periods in the past (around the Pershing missile crisis in 1981, the end of the cold war in 1989, and the war in the Balkans in the mid-1990s) and may do so again.

Trends in Turkey offer a sobering picture. Turkish respondents appear to be cooling toward both the U.S. and the EU, while warming toward Iran. Support for NATO has declined each year since 2004, as has support for joining the EU. Yet, these trends are not reflected in more critical attitudes in Turkey's younger generation, which has the most positive attitude toward both. American and European relations with Turkey, at a time when frustrations are growing about EU membership and instability on its borders, may prove vital to the prospects for transatlantic cooperation surrounding progress in the Middle East.

Looking ahead, the gap between the reported improvement in transatlantic relations at the official level and persistent negative views among European publics may simply reflect a time lag in the perception of change, especially if political leaders continue to declare their desire to leave behind the bitterness around Iraq. On the other hand, the persistence of negative views of President Bush among Europeans may indicate that their minds are made up, that change will only be possible with a new president after 2008. We have explored differences among European countries to show the contours of public opinion on a range of issues. There are also differences across the political spectrum and among European policymakers, themes which are explored in another, related survey project.[9] Public opinion is only one of many factors shaping foreign policy, a factor that is influential under some conditions, such as elections. We should look closely to this fall's midterm elections in the United States and to next year's presidential elections in France as politicians seek to gauge the public mood and their support for future policies.

[9] European Elite Survey, a project of the Compagnia di San Paolo. Please see www.affarinternazionali.it for the full data and analysis.

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Notes

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Notes

METHODOLOGY:

TNS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use of face-to-face interviews. In all countries a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, were interviewed. Interviews were conducted between June 6, 2006, and June 24, 2006.

For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based on the total European sample (n=12044), the margin of margin of error is plus or minus 1 percentage point. The average response rate for all 13 countries surveyed was 23.4%.

Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country. Unless otherwise specified, comparative data are reproduced from *Transatlantic Trends* 2003-2005 and/or from *Worldviews* 2002 (www.transatlantictrends.org).

When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR) and are available to scholars and other interested parties. At the time of printing, data for years 2002 through 2004 are available through ICPSR. For more information please consult the ICPSR catalog at www.icpsr.umich.edu.

NOTE ON EUROPEAN AVERAGES:

Over time, additional European countries have been added to the survey. While the addition of new countries has affected the Europe-wide average, the impact has usually not been statistically significant. Therefore, for ease of presentation, we have treated several different averages as if they were part of one average: the EU6 and EU7 averages are listed as part of the EU9, and the E10 average is listed as part of the E12. For additional information on the composition of the European averages, please consult the table below.

TABLE OF EUROPEAN AVERAGES:

YEAR	AVERAGE	COUNTRIES
2002	EU6	France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and The United Kingdom
2003	EU7	Same as the EU6 with the addition of Portugal
2004-2006	EU9	Same as the EU7 with the addition of Slovakia and Spain
2004-2005	E10	Same the EU9 with the addition of Turkey
2006	E11	Same as EU9 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania
2006	E12	Same as E10 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

www.transatlantictrends.org

A project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation