Transatlantic TRENDS

KEY FINDINGS 2007

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TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Key Findings 2007

With Angela Merkel as chancellor of Germany, Nicolas Sarkozy as president of France, and Gordon Brown as prime minister of the United Kingdom, the European leaders most closely identified with the transatlantic rift over Iraq—Gerhard Schröder, Jacques Chirac, and Tony Blair—have left office. All three new leaders have announced a new tone of pragmatic cooperation with the United States, raising the prospects for a revitalized transatlantic relationship. What do these changes in leadership promise for U.S.–European cooperation? Although relations have demonstrably improved at the official level across the Atlantic, what public opinion landscape will these new leaders inherit? Are the European publics prepared to support closer relations ahead of the 2008 U.S. presidential elections? How supportive is public opinion of closer cooperation on issues that have remained contentious between the United States and Europe?

While these new European leaders have declared their willingness to work with the United States, the primary foreign policy issue in the United States—the war in Iraq—is largely absent from the transatlantic agenda, and the prospects for cooperation on two major areas where the United States and Europe are working together—Afghanistan and Iran—remain uncertain. In this year's *Transatlantic Trends* survey, we explore support for reconstruction and combating the Taliban in Afghanistan. In addition, we devote close attention to public perceptions of the threat of a nuclear Iran and policy options should diplomacy fail. At the same time, we analyze threat perceptions of global issues such as international terrorism, energy dependence, immigration, and global warming. We also analyze views across the Atlantic and within Europe toward a more assertive Russia, including its role in the Middle East and as an energy provider, especially in light of January's temporary suspension of gas shipments to Europe through Belarus.

After a period of "reflection" following the rejection of the proposed constitutional treaty in 2005, European leaders agreed at the EU Council meeting in June on a new mandate for institutional reform, with the prospect of a new treaty before European parliamentary elections in 2009. In this year's survey, we further examine European views on taking responsibility for global threats and the deployment of military troops in a range of scenarios. In addition, we return to the issue of Turkey's relations with the West. Turkey has seen fierce debates about the role of the military in public life and the place of Islam in its secular democracy, at a time when accession negotiations with the EU remain difficult.

Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was conducted in the United States and 12 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation.

KEY FINDINGS OF THIS SURVEY INCLUDE[1]:

- Energy dependence and international terrorism were among the threats by which Americans and Europeans felt most likely to be personally affected. Americans felt most likely to be personally affected by energy dependence (88%), an economic downturn (80%), and international terrorism (74%). Europeans felt most

[1] Unless otherwise noted, Europe-wide percentages refer to the E12, except in sections one, three, and four where we discuss long-term trends, and in questions where we examine the opinions of current EU members.

likely to be personally affected by global warming (85%), energy dependence (78%), and international terrorism (66%).

- Eighty-eight percent of Europeans agreed that the European Union (EU) should take greater responsibility for dealing with global threats, and among those, the majority (54%) felt that the EU should do so in partnership with the United States rather than on its own.

- Among Europeans who support greater EU responsibility for dealing with international threats, the highest support was for spending more money on aid for development (84%), followed by increasing the use of trade to influence other countries (74%), and committing more troops for peacekeeping missions (68%). Only 20% supported committing more troops for combat actions in general.

- Solid majorities of Europeans (64%) and Americans (64%) supported contributing troops to international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Yet Europeans and Americans differed on whether to commit troops for combat operations against the Taliban, with the approval of 68% of Americans and 30% of Europeans.

- Eighty-three percent of Americans and 68% of Europeans agreed that a nuclear Iran would lead to further proliferation in the Middle East. Similarly, 54% of Europeans believed that a nuclear Iran has the potential to threaten Europe. If Iran was to acquire nuclear weapons, Americans (82%) and Europeans (68%) agreed it would supply nuclear weapons to terrorists.

- Should diplomatic efforts fail to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, most Americans and Europeans agreed that diplomatic pressure should be increased, but they differed over keeping the option of using military force. Forty-seven percent of Americans felt that diplomatic pressure should be increased while maintaining the option of military force, compared to just 18% of Europeans.

- When asked about recent developments in Russia, 79% of Americans and 65% of Europeans expressed greatest concern about Russia's role in providing weapons to the Middle East. Within the United States, there was little difference between Democrats and Republicans on Russia.

- Large majorities of Europeans (71%) continued to agree that it should be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries, while support for democracy promotion among Americans has fallen over the past three years from 52% in 2005 to 45% in 2006 to 37% in 2007.

- Only 36% of Europeans viewed U.S. leadership in world affairs as "desirable," a figure virtually unchanged from 2004, and the percentage of Europeans who approved of President Bush's international policies remained around 20 percentage points lower. This suggests that, while views of the United States are influenced by views of the President's policies, Europeans continue to distinguish between them.

- When asked how they felt transatlantic relations will be affected by the U.S. presidential election in 2008 regardless of who is elected, 46% of Europeans felt that relations will stay the same, compared with 35% who felt relations will improve and 6% who felt relations will get worse.

- Turkish feelings toward the United States and European Union continued to cool. On a 100-point "thermometer" scale, Turkish "warmth" toward the United States dropped from 20 degrees in 2006 to 11 degrees in 2007, and toward the European Union from 45 degrees to 26. Turkish feelings toward Iran also cooled this past year from 43 degrees to 30.

- Europeans thought it far more likely that Turkey will eventually join the EU: 56% of Europeans believed Turkey will join, compared with just 26% of Turkish respondents.

Section One: Trends in Transatlantic Relations

In April 2007, the United States hosted the annual U.S.-EU summit in Washington, DC, where American and European leaders sought to demonstrate improved relations at the working level with agreements on economic cooperation and climate change. U.S. President George W. Bush declared, "The closer that the United States and the EU become, the better off our people become."[2] German Chancellor Merkel observed that a "very close, very strategically oriented transatlantic partnership is in our mutual interest."[3] And in a speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of George C. Marshall's speech announcing the Marshall Plan, Daniel Fried, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, declared, "There is no closer partnership in the world than that between the United States and Europe."[4] Yet there has been a persistent gap between improvement at the official level and at the level of public opinion. A companion survey to *Transatlantic Trends* reported in 2006 that 40% of European parliament members and 38% of European Commission officials believed that U.S.–European relations had improved, compared with only 16% of the public.[5] Have the publics begun to perceive and share the sense of improvement which their leaders observe? Do they expect a change in relations with a new U.S. administration in 2009?

EUROPEANS REMAIN CRITICAL OF U.S. LEADERSHIP

A majority of Europeans remained critical of U.S. leadership in world affairs. Fifty-eight percent of Europeans viewed U.S. leadership in world affairs as "undesirable," compared with 36% who saw it as "desirable." After a sharp drop in 2003, these figures have been largely unchanged since 2004, representing a reversal of proportions of positive and negative views found in 2002. Of the countries surveyed, only the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Romania had more respondents who viewed U.S. leadership as desirable than as undesirable. The greatest drop was in Germany, which fell from 68% of respondents who viewed U.S. leadership as desirable in 2002 to 38% in 2007. In this period, the decline was 26 percentage points in Italy, 24 percentage points in Poland, 23 percentage points in the Netherlands, and 20 percentage points in France. Within the United States, support for U.S. leadership in world affairs remained strong, with 78% of Democrats and 93% of Republicans who viewed U.S. leadership as desirable.



Chart 1

[2] http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/eusummit/2007/index.html
[3] April 30, 2007, remarks to US Chamber of Commerce
[4] http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=July&x=20070702111533idybeekcm0.6824304
[5] European Elite Survey, 2006. See http://www.gips.unisi.it/circap/ees_overview for full data and analysis.

EUROPEANS MORE CRITICAL OF PRESIDENT THAN OF UNITED STATES

Europeans continued to differentiate their views of President Bush's handling of international policies from their views of U.S. leadership in global affairs. While European attitudes toward Bush's international policies remained critical (77% disapproval compared to 17% approval), a 20-point gap has persisted between their views of Bush and their views of U.S. leadership in world affairs since 2002. In the United States, a majority of Americans (60%) disapproved of President Bush's handling of international policies, a figure largely unchanged from last year, with 87% of Democrats and 26% of Republicans disapproving. (See chart #1)

IRAQ WAR AND PRESIDENT MAIN REASONS FOR DECLINE

When asked to choose the most important factor behind the decline in relations between the United States and Europe, Europeans were divided between the management of the war in Iraq (38%) and President Bush himself (34%). The highest percentages of respondents who felt that the war in Iraq was the main reason for the decline were found in Poland (53%) and Italy (42%), while the highest percentages who felt the decline in relations stemmed from President Bush himself were reported in the Netherlands (42%) and Germany (41%). Only four percent of European respondents felt the main reason for the decline was the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, whereas 11% felt the main reason was the United States not participating in the Kyoto treaty on global warming. Americans were also divided over the main reason for the decline, with 38% who felt that the main reason was the war in Iraq (a view shared by 56% of Republicans), and 39% who felt it was President Bush himself (a view shared by 59% of Democrats). (See chart #2)



Chart 2

PLURALITY OF EUROPEANS THINK 2008 ELECTION WON'T CHANGE RELATIONS

Forty-six percent of Europeans felt that transatlantic relations will stay the same following the U.S. presidential election in 2008 regardless of who is elected, compared with 35% who felt relations will improve and 6% who felt relations will get worse. The highest percentage of respondents who felt relations will improve was in France (51%), and the highest percentages who felt relations will remain the same were in Germany (54%) and Spain (52%). While the majority of Europeans believed that relations either will improve or could be mended, 19% felt that relations have simply become "too strained to recover," with the highest percentages in Portugal (33%), Spain (29%), and Poland (27%). (See chart #3)

AMERICANS MORE OPTIMISTIC ON RELATIONS AFTER 2008

In the United States, 42% of respondents felt transatlantic relations will improve after the 2008 elections regardless of who is elected, compared with 37% who felt relations will stay the same. Fifty-eight percent of Democrats felt that relations would improve compared with 26% of Republicans, whereas a majority of Republicans (54%) felt that relations would stay the same. Only 11% of Americans felt that relations have become "too strained to recover."

PROSPECTS FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFTER THE 2008 U.S. ELECTIONS



Chart 3

Section Two: Global Threats and Rising Powers

The United States and Europe continue to confront ongoing violence in the Middle East, as well as new challenges in energy security and rising powers such as Russia and China. According to a recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, the threat from Al Qaeda has grown in the past year, noting potential threats from radical cells in both Europe and the United States. Last summer's foiled train bombing in Germany has been followed by increased threat alerts and has provoked vigorous debate throughout Europe on the ability of governments to respond to such threats. German Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble sparked controversy by warning that his country was not immune from attack. "The danger level is high," he said. "We are part of the global threat by Islamist terrorism."[6] The car bomb attack at the Glasgow Airport in Scotland, as well as recurrent arrests of terror suspects in Italy and Spain, has prompted ongoing debate about the threat of terrorism on both sides of the Atlantic.

Although President Bush has declared that the United States has "strong working relationships" with Russia and China, contentious issues remain on the transatlantic agenda with both countries.[7] Americans and Europeans have questioned Russia's role as an energy provider after a dispute that led Russia to temporarily suspend the delivery of oil to Europe through Belarus in January 2007, echoing a similar dispute with Ukraine the year before. In response to debates about a potential U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov surprised many when he declared that Russia would consider targeting its nuclear missiles at Europe. As members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China have significant influence over the issues on the transatlantic agenda, including sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, final status for Kosovo, and action in Darfur.

AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS SHARE CONCERNS OVER ENERGY DEPENDENCE, TERRORISM

Energy dependence and international terrorism are among the threats by which Americans and Europeans felt most likely to be personally affected. Americans felt most likely to be personally affected by energy dependence (88%), an economic downturn (80%), and international terrorism (74%). Europeans felt most likely to be personally affected by global warming (85%), energy dependence (78%), and international terrorism (66%). Overall, Americans reported a higher threat perception than Europeans on every threat but global warming. (See chart #4)

OVERALL RISE IN EUROPEAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS

While Americans generally reported higher threat perceptions, Europeans reported larger changes since 2005. On international terrorism, the European average rose 16 percentage points (compared with virtually no change in the United States), with an increase in five countries. On Islamic fundamentalism, the European average increased 15 percentage points (compared with +7 percentage points in the United States), with rises in nine countries. On immigration, the European average rose 14 percentage points (compared with +9 percentage points in the United States), with increases in 10 countries. On global warming, the European average increased 12 percentage points (compared with +7 percentage points in the United States), with rises in 10 countries.

[6] http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/05/11/germany.security/index.html
[7] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070605-8.html

IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS, HOW LIKELY ARE YOU TO BE PERSONALLY AFFECTED BY THE FOLLOWING THREATS?



Chart 4

EUROPEANS LESS THREATENED BY ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

The threat of a major economic downturn was the only issue on which the European average fell, by nine percentage points (the United States reported virtually no change). Eight European countries reported decreases, with the sharpest drops in France (–20 percentage points), Poland (–18 percentage points), and Germany and the Netherlands (–16 percentage points). In Europe, only Spain reported a significant increase in the threat of an economic downturn (+11 percentage points).

GERMAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS RISE TO EUROPEAN LEVELS

Since 2005, the most dramatic changes in threat perceptions have occurred in Germany, where 70% of Germans (+32 percentage points since 2005) felt likely to be personally affected by international terrorism. In 2007, 57% of Germans (+28 percentage points since 2005) felt likely to be personally affected by Islamic fundamentalism, and 74% (+26 percentage points since 2005) felt likely to be personally affected by immigration. These changes brought German views closer to the European averages than in 2005, when threat perceptions in Germany on international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism were the lowest among the countries surveyed. Large increases in the perception of these threats were also seen in Italy and Spain.

AMERICANS WILLING TO REDUCE ENERGY DEPENDENCE EVEN IF PRICES RISE

Fifty-four percent of Americans felt the best approach to ensuring a stable supply of energy was reducing energy dependence on other countries even if energy prices would rise sharply at home. Twenty-four percent of Americans felt the best approach was increasing cooperation with energy-producing countries even if their governments

are undemocratic. Thirteen percent supported applying diplomatic pressure even if this increases tensions with energy-producing countries. Within the United States, the largest percentages of Democrats (49%) and Republicans (54%) agreed that the best approach among the three options was to reduce dependence on energy-producing countries. By contrast, Europeans were more divided, with 38% preferring to reduce energy dependence and 31% preferring to increase cooperation. Among Europeans, the highest percentages of respondents who preferred to increase cooperation with energy-producing countries even if their governments are undemocratic were in Romania (50%), Poland (45%), and Slovakia (40%). (See chart #5)

SHARED CONCERNS ABOUT MORE ASSERTIVE RUSSIA

When asked about their feelings of warmth toward Russia, Americans and Europeans showed little change from last year, with Americans slightly warmer at 48 degrees than Europeans at 42 degrees on a 100-point "thermometer" scale. Yet majorities on both sides of the Atlantic expressed concerns about recent developments in Russia. Seventy-nine percent of Americans and 65% of Europeans expressed concern about Russia's role in providing weapons to countries in the Middle East. Seventy-five percent of Americans expressed concern about the weakening of democracy inside Russia (compared with 57% of Europeans), and 59% of Europeans and 58% of Americans expressed concern about Russia's role as an energy provider. Sixty-nine percent of Americans and 56% of Europeans expressed concern about Russia's behavior toward its neighbors. Germans reported greater concerns than the European average on all these issues, ranging from +19 percentage points over the European average on the weakening of democracy inside Russia to +11 percentage points on Russia's behavior toward its neighbors. Within the United States, there was little difference between Democrats and Republicans in their concerns about Russia. (See chart #6)

PREFERENCES FOR ENSURING A STABLE SUPPLY OF ENERGY FROM ENERGY-PRODUCING COUNTRIES



Chart 5

MORE AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS SEE CHINA AS AN ECONOMIC THREAT

Americans and Europeans viewed China in economic terms similarly, with 54% of Americans and 48% of Europeans seeing China as more of an economic threat, compared to 36% of Americans and 35% of Europeans who saw China as more of an economic opportunity. By contrast, more Americans (50%) than Europeans (32%) viewed China as a military threat. Among Europeans, the highest percentages who viewed China as an economic threat were in France (57%), Italy (55%), and Portugal (55%), and the highest percentages who viewed China as a military threat were in Poland (44%), France (37%), and Germany and the United Kingdom (36%). Within the United States, Democrats and Republicans shared similar views of China in economic terms, but fewer Democrats (47%) than Republicans (61%) saw China as a military threat.

CONCERNS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA



Chart 6

Section Three: The European Union as a Global Actor

After a two-year period of "reflection," European leaders agreed at the EU Council meeting in June on a compromise concerning aspects of the proposed constitutional treaty, with the prospect of a new treaty before European parliamentary elections in 2009. "Uncertainty about our future treaty has cast a shadow of doubt over our ability to act. Now those doubts have been removed," declared European Commission President José Manuel Barroso.[9] The reform treaty will focus on a longer mandate for the EU president, stronger capacities in foreign affairs, and voting rights. Yet what vision do the publics have for an increased global role for the European Union? Do they support a European Union that would work in partnership with the United States or would they prefer the European Union to act independently? Many European countries have troops deployed in a number of crisis situations, including monitoring the ceasefire in Southern Lebanon and peacekeeping in Afghanistan. The European Union is preparing to deploy its largest civilian mission in Kosovo pending an agreement on final status at the UN Security Council. How willing are Europeans to support the use of force abroad?

EUROPEANS PREFER TO ADDRESS THREATS IN PARTNERSHIP WITH UNITED STATES

Virtually unchanged from last year, 77% of Europeans and 73% of Americans viewed strong leadership by the EU in

SHOULD THE EU ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL THREATS INDEPENDENTLY OR IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES?



Chart 7

[9] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c8880f8c-228b-11dc-ac53-000b5df10621,dwp_uuid=af8307da-1822-11dc-b736-000b5df10621.html



Chart 8

world affairs as desirable (within the United States, 79% of Democrats and 68% of Republicans supported strong EU leadership in world affairs). Eighty-eight percent of Europeans agreed that the EU should take greater responsibility for dealing with global threats, and of those, a majority (54%) felt that the EU should take greater responsibility for global threats in partnership with the United States, compared with 43% who felt it should address problems independently. (See chart #7)

SUPPORT FOR EU ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND PEACEKEEPING

Of Europeans who agreed that the EU should take greater responsibility for dealing with international threats, the largest support was for the EU spending more money on aid for development (84%), followed by increasing the use of trade to influence other countries (74%), and committing more troops for peacekeeping missions (68%). Only 20% of Europeans, however, supported committing more troops for combat actions in general. Among Europeans, the largest support for peacekeeping missions was in Spain (82%), France (80%), and Portugal (78%). While only a minority view, the largest support for committing combat troops was in the United Kingdom (35%), France (27%), and the Netherlands (26%). (See chart #8)

SUPPORT FOR TROOPS IN DARFUR, BALKANS, LEBANON, BUT NOT TO COMBAT TALIBAN

Majorities in Europe expressed their willingness to commit troops for a range of operations: 79% supported providing humanitarian assistance in Darfur, 67% supported maintaining peace and order in the post-conflict Balkans, 66% supported contributing to international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, and 59% supported monitoring a ceasefire in Southern Lebanon. Approval dropped considerably, however, when asked about support for combat operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, with the support of only 31% of Europeans. (See chart #9)

NEW EU MEMBERS BECOME MORE WILLING TO ABIDE BY EU DECISIONS

When asked if their country should abide by an EU decision to use military force, even if they disagree, 42% of Europeans agreed, compared with 55% who disagree. Compared with last year, the largest increase in those who agreed with this statement was found among new EU members, with 67% of Romanians (+20 percentage points), 49% of Bulgarians (+13 percentage points), and 36% of Slovaks (+9 percentage points). Agreement in Poland remained virtually unchanged at 51%. (See chart #10)



Chart 9



Chart 10

NEW EUROPEAN LEADERS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES?

In his acceptance speech, new French President Sarkozy declared, "I want to tell [our American friends] that France will always be on their side when they need it, but I also want to tell them that friendship means accepting that your friends may think differently."[10] Similarly, German Chancellor Merkel sought to improve relations between Germany and the United States, developing a closer working relationship with President Bush while raising concerns about Guantanamo Bay and climate change. With Gordon Brown as prime minister of the United Kingdom, a new slate of European leaders has replaced those in power during the crisis over Iraq in 2003. What will this mean for transatlantic relations, for a renewed European Union, and for cooperation on global issues? How do their publics view transatlantic relations and related issues such as Russia, China, and energy?

FRENCH, GERMAN, AND BRITISH REMAIN CRITICAL OF BUSH POLICIES

The French and German publics were close to the average European view of U.S. global leadership, with only 28% of French and 38% of Germans viewing U.S. leadership as desirable (compared with 50% of British respondents). All three publics were deeply critical of President Bush's handling of international policies, with only 12% of French, 13% of German, and 16% of British respondents approving of the his policies. In the past year, there has been little change in the views of German and British respondents about U.S.-European relations; 71% of German and 87% of British respondents said that relations have either remained the same or gotten worse. Among the French, however, there has been a slight but significant seven percentage-point increase in both those who said relations have improved and those who said relations have remained the same, and a 15

SHOULD THE EU ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL THREATS INDEPENDENTLY OR IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES?



Chart 11

[10] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6631125.stm

percentage point decrease in those who said relations have worsened.

FRENCH MOST SKEPTICAL OF PARTNERING WITH THE UNITED STATES

While the publics in all three countries overwhelmingly supported EU global leadership, they differed on whether the EU should address international threats in partnership with the United States or independently. Fifty-eight percent of the German and 55% of the British publics agreed that the EU should address threats in partnership with the United States, in comparison with only 39% of French respondents (the European average was 54%). By contrast, 58% of French respondents felt the EU should address problems independently from the United States. (See chart #11)

DECLINING SUPPORT FOR NATO IN ALL THREE COUNTRIES

Majorities of the French, German, and British publics continue to view NATO as essential to their country's security, consistent with the European average of 53%, but support has fallen in all three countries since 2002. In Germany, support for NATO fell from 74% in 2002 to 55% in 2007, and in the United Kingdom support has declined from 76% in 2002 to 64% in 2007. In France, support for NATO has seen a smaller decline, from 61% in 2002 to 55% in 2007. (See chart #12)

DIFFERING VIEWS ON SECURING ENERGY

More British (49%) than German (40%) and French (38%) respondents agreed that the best way to ensure a stable supply of energy is to reduce dependence on energy-producing countries, even if energy prices would rise at home. They also differed on whether to increase cooperation with energy-producing countries even if their governments are undemocratic, with 37% of Germans agreeing that they should, compared with 30% of French and 25% of British respondents.

GERMANS AND BRITISH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT RUSSIA

Seventy-three percent of the German and 64% of the British publics expressed concern about Russia's role as an energy provider, compared with 46% of French respondents (and 59% of Europeans and 58% of Americans). Similarly, 67% of the German and 64% of the British publics expressed concern about Russia's behavior toward its neighbors, compared with 56% of French respondents (and 56% of Europeans and 69% of Americans).

FRENCH, GERMANS, AND BRITISH DISAGREE ON CHINESE ECONOMY

The French, German, and British publics viewed the threat of China's economy markedly differently. Fifty-seven percent of French respondents saw China as more of an economic threat than an economic opportunity, compared with 51% of German and 40% of British respondents (and a European average of 48% and 54% of Americans). By contrast, the three publics agreed on whether China is a military threat, with only 37% of French, 36% of German, and 36% of British respondents saying that China is a military threat (compared with the European average of 32% and 50% of Americans).



Chart 12

Section Four: Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation—Afghanistan and Iran

Afghanistan and Iran are the two most prominent foreign policy issues on which the United States and Europe are working together, but the prospects for future cooperation remain uncertain. Although many European countries contribute to the International Security Assistance Force as part of NATO, debates over the renewal of the mandate to commit troops provoked a crisis within the Italian government and promises to be difficult in Germany this fall. At the same time, countries like the United Kingdom and Denmark are gradually increasing their troop presence in Afghanistan following their redeployment from Iraq. The United States and Europe (led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have maintained a common position toward Iran using targeted economic sanctions administered by the UN Security Council, which has previously passed two resolutions and is considering a third. Although there are disputes about the extent and progress of Iran's nuclear program, EU Commission President Barroso has said, "We share the same views, basically, about how to deal with Iran."[11]

Yet in both cases it is unclear how American and European publics will respond to the prospect of military force in the future if violence continues in Afghanistan and sanctions are seen to fail in Iran. Differences in diplomacy on Iran arise when American policymakers emphasize that "all options are on the table," although to date Americans and Europeans have emphasized that a military strike is not currently under consideration. The possible threat to Europe from a nuclear Iran has added to discussions about the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS SUPPORT RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Large majorities of Europeans (64%) and Americans (64%) supported contributing troops to international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, including 71% of French, 69% of British, and 57% of German respondents. The highest support among Europeans was found in Spain (81%), the Netherlands (75%), and Portugal (73%), with the lowest support in Bulgaria (39%), Slovakia (44%), and Turkey (50%). Within the United States, 73% of Republicans and 57% of Democrats supported contributing troops to international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. (See charts #13 and 14)



Chart 13

[11] U.S.-EU Summit, April 30, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070430-2.html



Chart 14

EUROPEANS HALF AS LIKELY TO SUPPORT TROOPS TO COMBAT TALIBAN

Europeans and Americans did not agree, however, about committing troops for combat operations against the Taliban, with the approval of 68% of Americans on the one hand and 30% of Europeans on the other. Among Europeans, the largest support came from the United Kingdom (51%), the Netherlands (45%), and France (36%). In the United States, Democrats showed nearly the same level of support for both combat (56%) and reconstruction (57%), while Republican support was higher for combat (86%) than for reconstruction (73%).

INCREASED DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE BUT DIFFERENCE OVER OPTION OF FORCE ON IRAN

Seventy-two percent of Americans and 59% of Europeans felt likely to be personally affected by Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. When asked which strategy they would most favor should diplomatic efforts fail, majorities of both Americans and Europeans agreed that diplomatic pressure should be increased but differed on whether the option of military force should be ruled out. Forty-seven percent of Americans felt that diplomatic pressure should be increased and the option of military force should be maintained, compared with 32% who felt the option should be ruled out. By contrast, only 18% of Europeans felt the option of military force should be maintained, compared with 47% of Europeans who felt that the option should be ruled out. Although a minority view, among Europeans, the highest support for maintaining the option of military force was in the Netherlands (28%) and the United Kingdom (26%). (See chart #15)

AGREEMENT THAT NUCLEAR IRAN WOULD LEAD TO PROLIFERATION OR TERRORISM

When asked what is likely to happen should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, 83% of Americans and 68% of Europeans believed that other countries in the Middle East would

decide that they should have nuclear weapons as well. Eighty-two percent of Americans and 68% of Europeans also believed that Iran would supply nuclear weapons to terrorists. In contrast, 43% of Americans and 52% of Europeans believed that Iran would use nuclear weapons for defensive purposes only.

SLIM MAJORITY OF EUROPEANS BELIEVE NUCLEAR IRAN WILL THREATEN EUROPE

In addition, 54% percent of Europeans believed that, if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, it would be likely to threaten Europe. Among Europeans, the highest level of agreement was in Poland (70%), Turkey (59%), and Germany (56%). The most skepticism was found in the Netherlands, where 58% believed it is unlikely a nuclear Iran would threaten Europe, and in France, where 55% believed it is unlikely. Sixty-seven percent of Americans believed that a nuclear Iran would threaten Europe, with 60% of Democrats and 81% of Republicans who agreed. (See chart #16)

DEMOCRATS SPLIT ON MAINTAINING THE OPTION OF FORCE WITH IRAN

Within the United States, Democrats and Republicans also agreed that, should diplomacy fail to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, pressure should be increased, but they differed on whether to rule out the option of the use of force. Democrats were roughly divided, with 40% who felt the military option should be ruled out and 35% who felt it should be maintained. By contrast, 65% of Republicans felt the option of military force should be maintained while 20% felt the option should be ruled out.

SHOULD DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FAIL, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIES WOULD YOU MOST FAVOR TO PREVENT IRAN FROM ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS?



Chart 15



Chart 16

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION FALLS IN THE UNITED STATES

Large majorities of Europeans (71%) continued to agree that it should be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries, while only 37% of Americans agreed that it should be the role of the United States. Support for democracy promotion among Americans has fallen over the past three years from 52% in 2005 to 45% in 2006 to 37% in 2007. Within the United States, support for democracy promotion has fallen in both parties, with Republican support declining from 76% in 2005 to 53% in 2007 and Democratic support declining from 43% in 2005 to 31% in 2007. (See chart #17)



Chart 17

GROWING ISOLATION OF TURKEY

Last year's *Transatlantic Trends* asked if Turkey was turning away from the West, noting declining support for EU membership, continued criticism of U.S. and EU global leadership, and declining support for NATO. While U.S. General Joseph Ralston was welcomed last year as special envoy to Turkey to address violence on the border with Iraq, U.S.–Turkish relations remain strained over the issue. Relations with the European Union took a negative turn when the EU suspended eight of the 35 chapters in accession negotiations and new French President Sarkozy reaffirmed his opposition to Turkey's EU membership. Turkey has held contentious debates this year about the role of the military in public life in the lead-up to parliamentary and presidential elections. While the governing AK Party increased its percentage of the popular vote, returning it to power in a parliament that also includes nationalist and Kurdish parties, its nomination of Abdullah Gül for president highlighted tensions within Turkish society about secularism and democracy.

TURKEY COOLING TOWARD THE U.S. AND EU BUT ALSO TOWARD IRAN

Turkish feelings toward the United States and European Union have continued to cool, with warmth toward the United States dropping from 20 degrees in 2006 to 11 in 2007 on a 100-point thermometer scale, and from 45 degrees to 26 toward the European Union. Younger Turks aged 18–24 continued to show slightly warmer feelings than the national average toward both the United States (15 degrees) and European Union (28 degrees). In contrast to last year, which saw an increase in warmth toward Iran, Turkish feelings toward Iran have cooled from 43 degrees to 30. Compared with both Americans and Europeans, Turkish respondents also show the coolest feelings toward Russia and China. (See chart #18)

TURKEY MOST CRITICAL OF U.S. AND EU LEADERSHIP

Turkish respondents continued to have the most critical views of U.S. and EU leadership in world affairs, with 74% of Turkish respondents who viewed U.S. leadership in world affairs as undesirable, an increase of five percentage points since 2006. For the first time, a majority (54%) also viewed EU leadership as undesirable, an increase of seven percentage points since 2006. Similarly, only three percent approved of President Bush's handling of international policies and 83% disapproved.

THERMOMETER READINGS—
TURKISH FEELINGS TOWARD OTHERS



Chart 18

TURKISH RESPONDENTS MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN EUROPEANS ABOUT EU MEMBERSHIP

The percentage of Turkish respondents who view EU membership as a good thing remains the largest group but continued to decline from 54% in 2006 to 40% in 2007, a drop of 14 percentage points. European views remained largely unchanged from last year, with the largest percentage of respondents (42%) viewing Turkish membership as neither a good nor bad thing, compared with 22% who view it as a good thing and 31% who view it as a bad thing. France and Germany continued to have the highest percentage of respondents who view Turkish membership as a bad thing (49% and 43%, respectively). When asked how likely it is that Turkey will join the European Union, 56% of Europeans felt it is likely that Turkey will join, compared with only 26% of Turkish respondents who agreed. (See chart #19)

CONTINUED DECLINE IN TURKISH VIEWS OF NATO

Turkish support for NATO has continued its decline since 2004, with Turkish respondents divided almost equally: 35% of respondents (–9 percentage points from last year) agreed that NATO is still essential for their country's security, while 34% said it is no longer essential, and 31% did not know or refused to answer. (See chart #20)



Chart 20



Chart 19

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Five: Conclusion

Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Gordon Brown may offer a new spirit of cooperation in transatlantic relations in Europe, but this year's *Transatlantic Trends* suggests they will need to tread carefully. The Bush administration and its policies remain deeply unpopular in Europe, even as most among European publics continue to separate their views of the Bush administration from those of the United States more generally. Even in the United Kingdom, where we find the most similar views on many issues such as the use of force, large majorities disagree with President Bush's international policies.

While attitudes on global threats suggest that Americans and Europeans may not see the world so differently, we may disagree on how best to handle them. There have been notable increases in threat perceptions in Europe on international terrorism, immigration, and Islamic fundamentalism, particularly in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Yet calls like those made by German Interior Minister Schäuble for greater governmental powers have been met by contentious debate over the balance between security, intelligence, and civil liberties. There is strong support on both sides of the Atlantic for contributing troops for reconstruction in Afghanistan, but European support for troops to combat the Taliban is only half that of Americans. And while Americans and Europeans agree that a nuclear Iran would pose a threat, they disagree over whether the military option should be kept on the table.

A European Union reinvigorated by a new treaty of institutional reform will continue to confront questions about its responsibility for dealing with global threats. A majority of Europeans who support the EU taking greater responsibility also wish to work in partnership with the United States. Europeans are willing to commit troops in a range of scenarios that include humanitarian assistance in Darfur, peacekeeping in the Balkans, and monitoring the ceasefire in southern Lebanon. At the same time, they remain deeply reluctant about the use of force for combat operations. Turkey, which shows signs of increasing isolation from West and East, remains a contentious issue on the EU agenda. As Turkish views of EU membership become more skeptical, the EU will continue to debate questions about its own identity.

In the United States, Americans remain divided over President Bush, but both Democrats and Republicans support strong U.S. leadership in global affairs and show only modest differences in threat perception and in dealing with Russia. Both parties have seen a decline in support for democracy promotion over the last three years, but the use of force remains a dividing issue between the parties in the United States, as well as across the Atlantic. Looking ahead to the 2008 presidential elections in the United States, *Transatlantic Trends*' findings suggest that U.S.–European relations will not be mended simply by the election of a new U.S. president or by the emergence of a new generation of European leaders. Rather, the conflict in Iraq and differences over the use of force will likely continue to affect transatlantic relations beyond the Bush presidency.

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Notes

METHODOLOGY:

TNS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use of face-to-face interviews. In all countries a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, were interviewed. Interviews were conducted between June 4, 2007, and June 23, 2007.

For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based on the total European sample (n=12053), the margin of margin of error is plus or minus one percentage point. The average response rate for all 13 countries surveyed was 22.7%.

Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country. Unless otherwise specified, comparative data are reproduced from Transatlantic Trends 2003-2006 and/or from Worldviews 2002 (www.transatlantictrends.org).

When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR) and are available to scholars and other interested parties. At the time of printing, data for years 2002 through 2005 are available through ICPSR. For more information please consult the ICPSR catalog at www.icpsr.umich.edu.

NOTE ON EUROPEAN AVERAGES:

Over time, additional European countries have been added to the survey. While the addition of new countries has affected the Europe-wide average, the impact has usually not been statistically significant. Therefore, for ease of presentation, we have treated several different averages as if they were part of one average: the EU6 and EU7 averages are listed as part of the EU9, and the E10 average is listed as part of the E12. For additional information on the composition of the European averages, please consult the table below.

TABLE OF EUROPEAN AVERAGES:

YEAR	AVERAGE	COUNTRIES
2002	EU6	France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and The United Kingdom
2003	EU7	Same as the EU6 with the addition of Portugal
2004–2006	EU9	Same as the EU7 with the addition of Slovakia and Spain
2004–2005	E10	Same the EU9 with the addition of Turkey
2006	E11	Same as EU9 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania
2007	EU11	Same as the EU9 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania
2006–2007	E12	Same as the E10 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

www.transatlantictrends.org

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